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The U.S. Supreme Court Hears
the Mickey Mouse Case
Editor’s Note: Brock Professor Ray Patterson
consulted and advised the counsel for Eldred
and was present for the arguments before the
U.S. Supreme Court. Patterson’s expertise in
the area of copyright is well known. He
recently co-authored an article on copyright in
1791, as the constitutional framers under-
stood it, with the University of Houston Law
Center’s Professor Craig Joyce. Another newly
authored work is "The DMCA: A Modern
Version of the Licensing Act of 1662" in the
Journal of Intellectual Property Law (2002).
The case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, argued before
the U. S. Supreme Court on October 9,
2002, is the most important copyright case
since 1834, when the court decided its first,
Wheaton v. Peters. In Wheaton, the court
ruled that under the Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution only Congress can
grant copyright for published works. In
Eldred, the court will decide the scope of
Congress’ copyright power. May Congress
grant, in the words of the Copyright
Clause, copyright only for a "limited
time[]" or may Congress extend the time
already granted for existing copyrights? This
is what Congress did in the Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), extending the
term for all copyrights, present and future,
for 20 years.
The CTEA is commonly referred to as the
Mickey Mouse Copyright Protection Act,
because the Disney Company was shortly
destined to lose the copyright of its favorite
child and allegedly curried favor with mem-
bers of Congress to rescue Mickey from the
horrible fate of falling into the public
domain where he would be unprotected
from mouse molesters. (This may be true,
since members of Congress are known to
suffer from a congenital defect known as
"the 30-pieces-of-silver syndrome.")
But even if the motive for the CTEA is
tainted, Congress did enact it, and the court
must decide the case on its merits. No one,
other than copyright holders, contends the
statute is sound policy but the issue is con-
gressional power. The problem the court
faces in limiting that power is that in the past
Congress, long before Mickey Mouse, had
extended copyright terms, and, indeed, it did
so in the 1976 Copyright Act. The court’s
problem is that if the CTEA is unconstitu-
tional, the ruling might be precedent for
holding the 1976 Act unconstitutional.
Fortunately, there are sound reasons for say-
ing the unconstitutionality of the CTEA is
not precedent for the unconstitutionality of
the 1976 Act. First, all extensions of copy-
rights in the past have been made as part of
a general revision of the copyright statute.
The CTEA is the first independent statute
to extend copyright terms. The importance
of this point is that none of the prior exten-
sions resulted in freezing the public
domain, which the CTEA did as of its
effective date. Under that statute, no copy-
righted work will go into the public domain
for 20 years. And, of course, if the CTEA is
constitutional, Congress can repeat the sce-
nario in 20 years and, given the unlikeli-
hood of a cure for the 30-pieces-of-silver-
syndrome, will probably do so. 
This result could be viewed as merely an
unfortunate consequence of bad policy,
except for one thing: The Copyright Clause
of the U.S. Constitution requires that copy-
right protect the public domain by limiting
copyright protection to new (and original)
works for a limited time. The first condi-
tion means that copyright cannot be used
to capture works in the public domain, the
second that all copyrighted works will go
into the public domain.
In addition, the extension of copyright terms
as part of a general revision of the copyright
statute has generally been made as a matter
of equity to avoid penalizing authors who
would otherwise not have the benefit of the
change in the law. These extensions can thus
be viewed as an exercise of equitable power
by Congress under the Copyright Clause.
The CTEA is clearly an exercise and,
arguably, an abuse of its legal power. 
Finally, it should be noted that none of the
prior extensions of the copyright term
resulted in freezing the public domain, as
does the CTEA. Prior to the 1976 Act,
copyright was granted for two terms, and,
to obtain the benefit of the second term,
the copyright holder had to renew the
copyright. Statistics show that only a small
percentage of copyright holders in fact
renewed their copyrights, which meant the
impact of the extensions on the public
domain was slight.
The ultimate point is the Copyright Clause
is a limitation on as well as a grant of con-
stitutional power. When Congress exceeds
those limits, courts should so hold. One of
the surprising things about Eldred is it is the
first case ever to challenge the constitution-
ality of a copyright statute - a remarkable
fact in view of the dozens and dozens of
copyright statutes Congress has passed in
over 200 years (since 1790) - and courts are
not used to questioning Congress’ copyright
power. Thus, it may be well to note that
just as Congress is bound by the Copyright
Clause in enacting copyright statutes, courts
should be bound by the clause in interpret-
ing those statutes.
One final point, Mickey’s emancipation
does not mean Disney can no longer claim
to be Mickey’s progenitor and, arguably, at
the age of 70 or so years, Mickey is entitled
to emancipation. Otherwise, Disney might
be charged with violation of the laws
against animal cruelty.
-Brock Professor of Professional Responsibility 
Ray Patterson
